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Abstract: Local governments’ use of citizen participation programs is influenced
by external environments, especially in the form of political institutions. Local
governments decide to expand or limit citizen participation in administrative
decision-making processes in response to political uncertainties created by different
types of political institutions. Despite the importance of institutional contexts,
few studies have examined the effects of these political institutions on the use of
citizen participation programs. This study empirically tested whether political
institutions affect the adoption of citizen participation programs. The results 
suggest that the council-manager form of government increases both the adoption
of citizen participation mechanisms and the use of citizen participation programs
in functional areas, while nonpartisan elections are associated only with the adop-
tion of citizen participation mechanisms. At-large elections show no statistical
association with either type of citizen participation. These findings suggest that
local political contexts play important roles in the adoption of bureaucratic practices
such as citizen participation programs and still support the classical assertion
that public administration is closely connected to politics.
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INTRODUCTION
Citizen participation in administrative processes has received much attention from
public administration scholars because citizen activities in social and political networks
can reduce citizens’ negative perceptions of government policies (Berman, 1997; Park
& Hwang, 2009).Despite such benefits, the literature has not provided detailed expla-
nations of why governments use such participation mechanisms. Studies have noted
external forces that encourage governments to select citizen participation programs
(Ebdon & Franklin, 2006; Yang & Callahan, 2007). These include pressure from
external stakeholders (Yang & Callahan, 2007), government structure (Nalbandian,
1991; Yang & Callahan, 2005), community environments and cultures (Ebdon, 2000;
Wang, 2001), and legal constraints (Ebdon & Franklin, 2006). Despite such empirical
evidence, prior studies have not investigated the impacts of politics on the adoption of
citizen participation programs. Public management studies have emphasized that public
bureaucracy is constrained by political influences because various external stakeholders
attempt to control bureaucracy to maximize their political interests (Pandey & Wright,
2006; Waterman, Rouse, & Wright, 2004).
This article calls attention to external political institutions because different types
of political institutions lead local bureaucrats to increase or decrease the use of citizen
participation programs. From the institutional perspective, citizen participation programs
are institutions created by operational rules. Institutional theories explain that multiple
levels of institutions exist within a community, and higher-level institutions affect
lower-level institutions (McCabe & Feiock, 2005; Ostrom, 2005; Williamson, 2000).
For example, political institutions at the constitutional level can affect the use of citizen
participation programs at the operational level. Different types of political institutions
create different external environments. The variety and use of citizen participation
mechanisms are constrained by these external environments.
Few studies have examined the effects of political institutions on citizen participa-
tion programs, but they have examined the form of government (Kweit & Kweit, 1981;
Nalbandian, 1991; Yang & Callahan, 2007). This study explores a missing link by asking
the following question: What political institutions encourage local governments to adopt
citizen participation programs, despite the increased costs? To answer this question, 
it builds upon the institutional perspective on citizen participation and empirically
examines whether political institutions affect the variety and use of citizen participation
programs at the local level.
The article proceeds as follows. First, it reviews prior studies that have examined
the antecedents of citizen participation. Next, it develops a theoretical framework and
hypotheses by integrating multilevel institutional theories, rational choice theory, and
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transaction cost theory. Focusing on the variables of political institutions and citizen
participation programs, it empirically tests a few models that explain the associations
among these variables. Lastly, it discusses the findings, implications, and limitations
of the study.
LITERATURE REVIEW: 
THE ANTECEDENTS OF CITIZEN PARTICIPATION
Citizen participation has been defined as “citizens’ involvement in the administrative
decision making and management process” (Yang & Pandey, 2011, p.880). Citizen
participation improves democratic values by directly reflecting citizens’ preferences, but
it entails administrative costs such as delayed decisions and the loss of decision-making
control (Irvin & Stransbury, 2004; Moynihan, 2003). Prior normative and empirical
studies have examined what factors motivate administrators to use citizen participation
mechanisms.
First, scholars have noted internal contexts, such as the purpose and attributes of
decisions, that lead administrators to use citizen involvement programs. The literature
indicates that governments use citizen participation mechanisms for the purpose of
manipulation, discovery, persuasion, and legitimization (Arnstein, 1969; Walters,
Aydelotte, & Miller, 2000). In a classical work, Arnstein (1969) suggests a ladder of
citizen participation and argues that bureaucrats take advantage of citizen participation
mechanisms to manipulate citizens’ opinions at the level of nonparticipation, while 
the mechanisms improve legitimacy by ensuring citizens’ delegated powers at the
higher levels of citizen participation. Attributes of administrative decisions also cause
government to use citizen participation mechanisms. Thomas (1990) shows in a decision-
making flow chart that bureaucrats engage in public involvement efforts when they
have a lack of information, unstructured problems, and conflicting issues. Trust is also an
important internal factor that motivates administrators to establish citizen participation
programs. Empirical evidence indicates that administrators are more committed to citizen
participation when they trust citizens (Yang, 2005, 2006). These studies describe the
internal contexts that arise when explaining why governments adopt citizen participation
mechanisms.
Other studies have focused on external contexts that drive administrators to use 
citizen participation mechanisms despite increased internal costs (Ebdon, 2000; Ebdon
& Flankin, 2006; Kweit & Kweit, 1981; Miller & Evers, 2002; Nalbandian, 1991;
Wang, 2001; Yang & Kallahan, 2007). Yang and Callahan (2007) find that both push
and pull factors affect citizen involvement efforts and that external stakeholders push
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administrators to undertake such efforts. Studies have also found that the council-
manager form of government and large population size are external forces that lead to
the adoption of citizen participation programs at the local level. Professional managers
in the council-manager form of government are eager to seek citizens’ input to maintain
their reputations (Ebdon, 2000; Kweit & Kweit, 1981; Wang, 2001; Yang & Callahan,
2007).
Large local governments have increased citizens’ access to decision-making processes
due to diverse groups’ demands (Protasel, 1988; Nalbandian, 1991). The extent to which
a participatory culture is embedded in administrators’ and citizens’ perceptions also
affects the degree of citizen participation. Governments are more likely to implement
citizen participation programs when they experience citizen participatory cultures
within an administrative process (Ebdon, 2002; Kweit &Kweit, 1981; Miller & Evers,
2002). Lastly, legal constraints are an external environmental factor that compels local
governments to adopt citizen participation programs. Many states legally require local
governments to include citizens’ input in budgetary processes (Ebdon & Flankin,
2006).
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND: 
AN INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON CITIZEN PARTICIPATION
Although prior empirical studies have discovered the external determinants of citizen
participation, few studies have investigated the impacts of political institutions on the
use of citizen participation. Given that politics and administration are closely intercon-
nected (Rainey, 2003), there is a need to explore the missing links between politics
and citizen participation in administrative decision-making processes. To address this
issue, this article builds upon the institutional perspective on citizen participation,
because citizen participation programs as institutional mechanisms are influenced by
political institutions which create different external environments. Stewart (2007)
touches on a variety of institutional mechanisms of citizen participation and introduces
many institutional mechanisms classified by the level of decision making delegated to
citizens. Stewart’s study provides a well-designed model to introduce multiple dynamic
institutional citizen participation mechanisms, but does not explain how other institu-
tions affect the adoption of various citizen participation programs. Therefore, we still
do not know about the other institutions that motivate bureaucrats to design citizen
participation programs.
Multilevel institutional theories account for hierarchical links between high-level
(constitutional) institutions and low-level (operational) institutions. Ostrom (2005)
28 The Effect of Political Institutions on the Use of Citizen Participation Programs
The Korean Journal of Policy Studies
argues that institutions are a set of rules prescribed by participants to achieve pre-
dictability within defined situational arenas. These rules have multilevel structures
from constitutional choice rules to operational rules. Constitutional-level rules affect
operational rules by determining actors’ incentive structures in crafting the operational
rules (Buchanan & Tullock, 1962). Similarly, Williamson (2000) classifies institutions
into institutional environments (external environmental systems) and institutional
arrangements (governance structures designed properly at the organizational level).
Institutional environments affect institutional arrangements by motivating actors to
design operational institutions. Multilevel institutional theory suggests that the institu-
tional mechanisms of citizen participation at the operational level are influenced by
political institutions at the constitutional level, because different political institutions
create different institutional environments associated with the adoption of citizen 
participation.
Figure 1 displays the conceptual logic that explains the hierarchical institutions 
in relation to political institutions and citizen participation. While different studies
have used different terminology, for the purposes of this study local political institu-
tions are considered constitutional (high-level) institutions because they are created by
a local constitution (such as a municipal charter), which establishes an institutional
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Figure 1. The Institutional Mechanism of Citizen Participation
environment, and citizen participation programs are considered operational (low-level)
institutions because they are created by administrative law, which establishes an 
institutional arrangement.
Based on this logic, how do political institutions in a municipal charter affect the
adoption of citizen participation programs at the operational level? Rational choice
theory and transaction cost theory in political science can explain the adoption of citizen
participation associated with political contexts. Rational choice theory assumes that
elected officials are rational actors who seek to maximize self-interest in relation to re-
election. Transaction cost theory accounts for the effects of constitutional institutions
on the institutional adoption of citizen involvement efforts. Williamson (1981) regards
transaction cost as an important mechanism for institutional change. Rational actors
with bounded rationality confront the uncertainty generated by high levels of transaction
costs. In a political market, elected officials have high-powered incentive for reelection
and confront high levels of transaction costs due to uncertainty about their reelection
(Frant, 1996). Therefore, the rational choice of politicians is to seek short-term policies
that improve their chances of reelection and attempt to control the local bureaucracy
for their own political benefit. In these external environments, local bureaucrats have
difficulty designing citizen participation programs because they are more constrained
by elected officials’ pressures than by citizens’ substantive needs.
Early progressive reforms created various political institutions designed to reduce
transaction costs by structurally isolating the civil service from politicians seeking short-
term political benefits. When a local bureaucracy is less influenced by politics, public
managers seek long-term policies. Citizen participation programs can be good policy
tools that help local managers to listen to citizen needs when making long-term policies.
Long-term policies produce important policy outcomes due to their broad and durable
impacts. Therefore, governments attempt to improve the quality of such significant
decision making by reflecting citizens’ ideas and opinions (Arnstein, 1969). Public
managers also regard citizen participation as a useful tool that legitimizes important
administrative or policy decision making because it can reduce citizens’ objections or
resistance (Moynihan, 2003). Local public managers use citizen participation programs
to ensure the quality and legitimacy of long-term decision-making.
HYPOTHESES: 
POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND CITIZEN PARTICIPATION
Local political structures are particularly salient in explaining the transaction costs
associated with political uncertainty because cities in the United States have varied
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political institutions. Frederickson and Johnson (2001) find that US cities are either
political or administrative and have adapted over time. They classify cities into five types
on a continuum: purely political, adapted political, fully adapted, adapted administrative,
and purely administrative. Political cities are characterized by political institutions such
as directly elected mayors, councilors elected by district, and partisan elections, and
they experience more competition among political coalitions (Frederickson, Johnson,
& Wood, 2003). Administrative cities are characterized by the council-manager form
of government, at-large elections, and nonpartisan elections that are designed to struc-
turally shield local bureaucracies from political influences (Keating, 1991).
Administrative cities can increase the long-term effects of policies because the
local bureaucracy is less constrained by politicians who seek short-term policy success
due to their desire for reelection. For example, in the council-manager form of govern-
ment, a professional manager appointed by the city council serves instead of an elected
mayor. Nonpartisan elections exclude political influences by prohibiting local council
members from joining a party. At-large elections reduce political influences such as
local interest group lobbying within a narrow jurisdiction by electing local council
members across several jurisdictions.
The council-manager form of government creates less uncertainty than the mayor-
council form of government. The appointment of a professional manager helps protect
the local bureaucracy from political influences. In contrast, in the mayor-council form
of government, mayors are directly elected by voters and confront political uncertainty,
with a powerful incentive to be reelected in the next election. Elected mayors consider
constituents’ preferences because they are rational actors who seek to maximize their
own political benefits. Elected mayors’ citizen participation efforts are determined only
by their short-term electoral incentives, and they withhold administrative information
from citizens when the information opposes their political benefit (Greenstone &
Peterson, 1971). Even though they adopt citizen participation programs, the purpose is
likely to be manipulation or “window dressing” to gain citizens’ political support,
which may lead to citizens’ non participation or inauthentic participation (Arnstein,
1969; King, Felety, & Susel, 1998).
On the other hand, public managers in the council-manager form of government are
shielded from political uncertainty and thus adopt various citizen participation programs
in order to seek long-term community prosperity without political considerations.
Empirical studies have also shown that the council-manager form of government is
more likely to pursue citizens’ input because professional managers encourage citizen
participation in administrative processes (Kweit & Kweit, 1981; Nalbandian, 1991;
Yang & Kallahan, 2005, 2007; Ebdon, 2002). Professional managers have a more 
substantive incentive to protect their professional reputations and enhance their careers
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by improving long-term municipal performance. Cities with the council-manager form
of government adopt more long-term community economic development policy instru-
ments such as incentive zoning, business attraction plans, and financial incentives than
do cities with elected mayors (Feiock, Jeong, & Kim, 2003; Feiock, Tavares, & Lubell,
2008). Citizen involvement programs are established to acquire feedback, which
improves outcomes because professional managers are familiar with professional tools
that capture customer needs (Yang & Callahan, 2005, 2007).
Hypothesis 1: Local governments with the council-manager form of government
are more likely to adopt citizen participation programs.
Nonpartisan elections reduce elected officials’ partisan political incentives. Council
members or other officials elected in nonpartisan elections are more independent from
partisan influences such as patronage. Nonpartisan elections also mitigate transaction
costs in the electoral process by diminishing the possibility that voters can identify
the party of a political candidate. On the contrary, partisan politicians are strongly
controlled by party organizations which are influenced by the demands of constituents
or interest groups who support their parties (Mayhew, 1986). Moreover, they need to
be reappointed as party candidates in the next election. As a result, partisan elections
provide elected officials with incentives to adopt policies that benefit partisan con-
stituents, because partisan politicians’ rational choice is to maximize the possibility of
reelection by following the party’s policies.
Historically, the spoils system appointed public employees who implemented 
partisan policies (Miller, 1985). These party-oriented policies are short term or inefficient
and lose legitimacy due to their politically skewed effects. A citizen participation 
program is a long-term policy instrument to strengthen legitimacy, despite administrative
costs. Accordingly, a municipal government with partisan elections is less likely to
engage in citizen involvement efforts because elected officials affiliated with a party
do not have incentives to adopt a long-term policy instrument. Furthermore, although
partisan elected officials adopt citizen participation programs, the mechanisms may
be a citizen mobilization program to promote political participation or may be an
inauthentic citizen engagement activity because citizens have a negative perception of
the manipulation involved in mobilization programs (Yang & Callahan, 2007). On the
other hand, administrators and elected officials in cities with nonpartisan elections feel
less uncertain, since they are well shielded from partisan political influences, which
incentivizes them to seek more citizen input into the administrative process because
they do not need to consider short-term partisan interests.
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Hypothesis 2: Local governments with nonpartisan elections are more likely to
adopt citizen participation programs.
The municipal institutions used to select city council members may determine the
level of citizen participation encouraged by local governments. Theoretically, elected
officials have powerful incentives due to greater political uncertainty in relation to
their constituents’ preferences. Local council members’ rational choice is to represent
dominant stakeholders who can influence their reelection. Council members elected
by district consider their constituents’ specific interests within districts, while council
members selected by at-large elections represent median constituents’ interests across
districts (Maser, 1998). Empirical evidence indicates that municipalities with at-large
elections actively implement civil service reforms, pro-development policies, and
fewer impact fees, with reduced external pressures from local stakeholders (Feiock,
Jeong, & Kim, 2003; Feiock, Tavares, & Lubell, 2008; Ruhil, 2003).
In contrast, district-specific elections lead local governments to adopt pro-environ-
ment policies due to the pressure from interest groups who have a dominant power
within the district. Local council members elected through at-large elections are less
constrained by local interest groups with dominant powers within a narrow electoral
district and create rules or policies to secure long-term community performance.
Accordingly, local council members will encourage the local bureaucracy to ensure
more citizens’ inputs in policy processes because they believe that citizen participation
is beneficial to long-term prosperity for community prosperity and for average citizens.
This study assumes that municipal governments with at-large elections will use more
citizen participation programs because council members selected by at-large elections
are not constrained by narrow district interests and will push the local bureaucracy to
seek broad voter input in the long term.
Hypothesis 3: Local governments with at-large election are more likely to adopt
citizen participation programs.
This study also controlled the effects of other factors on the adoption of citizen 
participation programs. First, the characteristics of local management affect the adoption
of citizen participation. For example, local governments with lower budgets may not
adopt many citizen participation programs because citizen involvement efforts increase
administrative costs. On the other hand, when local governments are actively engaged in
performance management and measurement, they establish many citizen participation
tools to acquire citizen ideas as well as to measure the quality of public services from
citizens’ perspectives. To control these effects, this study examined the associations
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between per—capita local spending and performance activities and the use of citizen
participation programs.
Community demographic characteristics may also be associated with the adoption
of citizen participation mechanisms. This study examined whether population, diversity,
education level, or income affects the municipal adoption of citizen participation 
programs. Among the municipal demographic variables, prior studies identified that
population size and heterogeneity are antecedents of citizen participation (Andrew,
2009; Ebdon, 2000; Nalbandian, 1991; Protasel, 1988; Yang & Callahan, 2005, 2007;
Wang, 2001). These studies found that large cities exhibit a more heterogeneous popu-
lation, leading to increased conflicts because of residents’ diverse needs, and thus the
cities seek more citizen participation to mitigate the conflicts. The effects of income
and educational level on citizen participation were also investigated, because educated
residents in wealthy cities are highly interested in local policy and administration.
In addition to city demographics, participatory cultures may affect the adoption of
citizen participation. Prior studies found that cities in southern areas with traditional
cultures use less citizen involvement programs in their budgetary process (Ebdon,
2000). Metropolitan areas may also be associated with citizen participation, because
citizens in urbanized regions have easy access to citizen participation programs.
METHODOLOGY
Data Collection
This study collected data from several sources. Data for the dependent variables
were taken from the ICMA State of Profession Survey (2006) and the ICMA Municipal
Form of Government Survey (2006). The ICMA State of Profession Survey question-
naires were mailed in the spring and summer of 2006 to the chief administrative 
officers of municipalities with populations more than 2,500 in the United States. Of
the 8,003 municipalities and counties that received surveys, 2,870 responded to the
survey (response rate: 35.9%). For the ICMA Municipal Form of Government 2006
Survey, questionnaires were mailed to 8,278 municipalities, also in 2006. A total of
3,864 municipalities responded to the survey (response rate: 46.7%).
Data for the explanatory variables came from the ICMA Municipal Form of 
Government 2006 Survey, the IMCA State of Profession 2006 Survey, the US Census
Population (2000), and the US Census Local Government Finance (2002). This study
merged these data sets through the SPSS function and removed cities that had missing
values in multiple datasets. It ran a series of T-tests comparing the average values of
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the primary variables between the original datasets and the merged dataset to check
whether the merged dataset accurately represented the original datasets. The results
indicated that the primary variables did not statistically differ between the merged
dataset and original datasets (p < 0.05).1
Measurement
In general, citizen participation is encouraged by establishing operating programs
and rules. This study employed two institutional citizen participation variables—citizen
participation mechanisms and citizen participation in services and management—as
dependent variables (Wang, 2001). The ICMA State of Profession 2006 survey provides
data on various citizen participation mechanisms used by local governments. This
study identified six citizen participation mechanisms (council meeting, town meeting,
neighborhood meeting, citizen board or commission, ad hoc task force, and citizen
survey).
The ICMA Form of Government 2006 survey identified citizen involvement mech-
anisms din 23 service areas and management functions. Out of these, this study selected
10—transportation, zoning, finance, civil service, police and safety, libraries, housing,
economic development, code enforcement, and parks and recreation—suggested by
the previous literature (Wang, 2001). The dependent variables were measured by the
number of citizen participation mechanisms and citizen participation in services and
management functions. To test the validity of the dependent variables, this study ran a
factor analysis, conducting the Varimax rotation, which is commonly recommended.
Most variables were distinctly explained by two latent factors, except the town meeting
(factor loading: 0.291) and the use of citizen participation in the civil service (0.288).
This study dropped those two variables. Table 1 reports the factor loadings explained
by each dimension of the citizen participation program.
For the independent variables, first, the institutional variables such as form of 
government, at-large council elections, and nonpartisan elections were employed from
the ICMA Form of Government 2006 Survey. If a local government had a council-
manager form of government, it was coded as 1, otherwise as 0. To measure nonpartisan
elections, this study examined whether the council candidates had a political party
affiliation in the election. Nonpartisan election was coded as 1 if the local election 
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1. The mean numbers of citizen involvement mechanisms were 3.68 and 3.64 in the merged
dataset and the ICMA State of Profession 2006, respectively. The mean numbers of citizen
involvement in services and management functions were 3.40 and 3.29 in the merged data
set and the ICMA Municipal Form of Government 2006, respectively.
ballot did not show a political party affiliation for the council candidate, otherwise as
0. For the council elections, this article also coded local governments with council
members selected by at-large electionsas1and others as 0.
This study also controlled the effects of management characteristics such as local
spending and performance activities on citizen participation. The amount of local
spending was measured from the US Census Local Government Finance 2002 by per
capita total local expenditure. If local governments were engaged in performance 
management and measurement activities, this was coded as 1, and if not, as 0. The
variable was measured from the ICMA State of Profession Survey 2006. Demographic
and geographical characteristics were also employed as control variables. This article
selected population, diversity, median income, and educational level from the census
population data. Population and diversity were measured by per thousand population
and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index,2 respectively. Income was represented by per
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2. Herfindahl-Hirschman Index means how diverse a local jurisdiction is in terms of ethnicity. 
Table 1. Factor Analysis
Factor 1: Citizen participation Factor 2: Citizen participation 
mechanisms in services and management
Council meeting -0.077 0.570
Town meeting -0.050 0.291
Neighborhood meeting 0.135 0.554
Citizen board/commission 0.037 0.694
Ad hoc task force 0.108 0.624




Civil service 0.288 -0.071
Police/safety 0.502 0.007
Economic development 0.552 0.107





capita income, and educational level was measured by the percentage of residents with
more than a bachelor’s degrees. Geographic variables were measured by whether cities
were located in the southern region or in a metropolitan (central) area, as identified in
the ICMA State of Profession Survey. If a city was located in the south, it was coded
as 1, and if not, as 0. A city in a metropolitan area was coded as 1, and other cities
were coded as 0. The appendix summarizes these data and their sources.
Analysis
We ran descriptive analyses to report the number of the citizen participation institu-
tions adopted by local government and tested whether there were differences in the
percentage of adoptions across political institutions by a series of chi-square difference
tests. We also tested whether political institutions at municipal charter increased the
adoption of citizen participation programs using Poisson regression analyses,3 because
the dependent variables were count variables.4 Two models were analyzed to examine the
effects of political institutions on two institutional mechanisms of citizen participation.
RESULTS
Table 2 summarizes the mean, standard deviation, and minimum and maximum
values for each variable. The results indicate that, on average, municipal governments 
in the United States adopt 3.40 citizen participation mechanisms and use citizen partic-
ipation in 3.24 service and management functions. In the political institutions variables,
the mean values of nonpartisan election were the highest (Mean = 0.815, Standard
Deviation = 0.388), which reveals that most city governments are shielded from partisan
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If the value is 1, the local jurisdiction is the most diverse.
3. The Poisson regression model requires the assumption of equidispersion—the mean value
of the dependent variable must be equal to its variance (Hoffman, 2004). The assumption
tests showed underdispersion because the mean values are greater than the variances
(means: 3.408, 3.243; variances: 1.538, 1.990). This study corrected the underdispersion by
using robust standard errors in Stata 12; negative binominal regression was used to correct
overdispersion.
4. When the dependent variable was a count variable (number), Poisson or negative binominal
regression was used. This study also tested the assumptions of OLS regression such as
residual normality, homoskedasticity, and multicollinearity in order to check whether the
OLS regression was appropriate. The tests found heteroskedasticities in the models, and
the Poisson regression analyses were executed instead of the OLS regression.
local political pressure as a result of municipal reforms that have been implemented
since the early progressive government reform. The council-manager form of govern-
ment and at-large elections had the mean values of 0.651 and 0.653, respectively, which
indicates that 65.1% and 65.3% of cities, respectively, have the council-manager form
of government and at-large election.
Table 3 presents an additional comparison of the adoptions of citizen participation
programs across three political institutions. Overall, municipal governments adopted
the most council meetings, and 91.3% of cities used council meetings for citizen 
participation. Neighborhood meetings were the least used by municipal governments
(40.5%). In the use of citizen participation programs in services and management,
municipalities used citizen participation programs the most (79.8%) in zoning and the
least (12.4%) in police and safety. The adoption rates for all citizen participation
mechanisms were higher in cities with the council-manager form of government and
nonpartisan elections than in other cities. The rate of adoption of citizen participation
in services and management did not vary across different political institutions.
Following the chi-square difference test, we performed the sequential Poisson
regression analyses to test the hypotheses (Table 4). Hypothesis 1 was partially sup-
ported, and the council-manager form of government increased the adoption of citizen
participation mechanisms (incidence rate ratio or IRR: 1.136, p < 0.01),5 even though it
has a partially significant impact on citizen participation in services and management
38 The Effect of Political Institutions on the Use of Citizen Participation Programs
The Korean Journal of Policy Studies
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics
Variable N Mean SE Min Max
Citizen participation mechanisms 1,665 3.408 1.240 0 5
Citizen participation in services and management 1,710 3.243 1.990 0 9
Council-manager form 1,710 0.651 0.475 0 1
Nonpartisan election 1,628 0.815 0.388 0 1
At-large election 1,637 0.653 0.476 0 1
Per capita local expenditure 1,478 1,393 1,021 0.010 9,800
Performance activity 1,451 0.470 0.499 0 1
Population (per thousand) 1,493 2,516 4,739 1,415 791,353
Diversity (Herfindahl-Hirschman Index) 1,485 0.268 0.170 0 0.728
Per capita income 1,496 22,414 11,282 6,967 112,408
Educational level 1,496 25.23 15.46 1 84
Southern region 1,710 0.282 0.450 0 1
Metropolitan (central) 1,710 0.077 0.267 0 1 
(IRR: 1.068, p < 0.1, threshold: p < 0.05). This result indicates that local governments
with the council-manager form of government adopt 13.6% more citizen participation
mechanisms than local governments with other governmental structures, holding other
explanatory variables constant. Hypothesis 2 was partially supported. Nonpartisan
elections increased citizen participation mechanisms (IRR: 1.193, p < 0.01), while
they did not affect the use of citizen participation in services and management. The
result suggests that municipal governments with nonpartisan elections adopt 19.3%
more citizen participation mechanisms than other governments when other explanatory
variables are held constant. Hypothesis 3 was fully rejected; at-large elections were
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Table 3. Adoption Rate of Citizen Participation Institutions across Political Institutions
Adoption 
Council Nonpartisan At-large 
manager? election? election?
rate
Yes No Yes No Yes No
Citizen participation mechanisms (%)
Council meeting 91.3 94.2** 86.6** 96.2** 86.7** 90.8 93.0
Neighborhood meeting 40.5 46.9** 28.9** 43.5** 28.9** 33.8** 44.7**
Citizen board/commission 89.0 91.9** 84.1** 91.1** 81.4** 88.8 90.1
Ad hoc task force 59.4 64.4** 51.0** 62.8** 47.8** 60.3 58.5
Citizen survey 57.6 61.0** 52.0** 60.0** 49.0** 58.6 55.4
Citizen participation in services and management (%)
Transportation 21.2 25.3** 14.3** 22.5* 16.9* 22.3 20.8
Zoning 79.8 79.8 79.8 79.2* 84.4* 78.5* 83.3*
Finance 18.5 18.3 18.9 18.6 17.3 19.5 17.3
Libraries 38.4 38.0 39.1 40.7** 31.6** 35.1** 46.1**
Housing 26.9 27.5 26.1 27.9 22.9 24.5 30.8
Police and safety 12.4 12.2 12.9 12.3 12.0 11.1 15.3
Economic development 38.4 39.4 36.7 39.2 35.2 36.4* 41.0*
Code enforcement 24.1 25.7* 21.4* 23.3 26.2 23.5 25.5
Parks and recreation 64.2 38.6* 34.1* 65.9* 59.6* 65.3 63.9
Chi-square difference: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01
5. Poisson regression uses a log-link function similar to logit regression, and thus coefficients
need to be exponentiated to get a meaningful number to interpret. The incidence rate
ratio (IRR) deals with the incidence rates of a dependent variable affected by independent
variables.
not associated with either citizen participation mechanisms or citizen participation in
services and management.
In the control variables, per capita total local expenditure and performance management
and measurement activities are associated with both citizen participation mechanisms
and citizen participation in services and management. Population size and city education
level were statistically associated with both dependent variables. Per capita income
had a positive impact on citizen participation mechanisms, while it negatively affected
citizen participation in services and management. Diversity was associated only with
citizen participation mechanisms. Central metropolitan areas increased both citizen
participation mechanisms and citizen participation in functional areas, while the southern
region showed a negative association only with the citizen participation mechanisms.
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Table 4. Poisson Regression Results
Citizen participation Citizen participation in 
mechanisms services and management
Coefficient (SE) IRR Coefficient (SE) IRR
Council-manager form 0.128** (0.249) 1.136 0.066# (0.038) 1.068
Nonpartisan election 0.160** (0.338) 1.174 -0.002 (0.059) 1.000
At-large election -0.034# (0.019) 0.966 -0.058 (0.036) 0.943
Per capita local expenditure 0.021** (0.008) 1.021 0.068** (0.015) 1.070
Performance activity 0.110** (0.019) 1.113 0.066# (0.035) 1.068
Population (per thousand) 0.006** (0.001) 1.006 0.008** (0.002) 1.008
Diversity (Herfindahl-Hirschman Index) 0.248** (0.69) 1.128 -0.076 (0.127) 0.926
Per capita income 0.001* (0.001) 1.001 -0.001** (0.000) 0.999
Educational level 0.005** (0.001) 1.005 0.005* (0.002) 1.005
Southern region -0.087** (0.021) 0.916 -0.004 (0.040) 0.995
Metropolitan (central) 0.093** (0.027) 1.098 0.163** (0.060) 1.176
N 1,156 1,175
Waldo chi-square 327.77** 84.10**
Pseudo R-square 0.0266 0.0193
# p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01
IRR= incidence rate ratio
IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION
There have been long debates on the relationship between politics and bureaucracy
(Fry, 1998; Shafritz & Hyde, 2012). The results of this study show that politics influences
bureaucratic programs such as citizen participation mechanisms through multilevel
institutional dynamics. The findings also demonstrate that political institutions external
to local bureaucracies create external environments where local bureaucrats establish a
variety of citizen participation institutions at the operational level in response to external
influences.
Overall, the findings reveal that political contexts influence only the adoption of
citizen participation mechanisms, rather than the substantive use of citizen participa-
tion in functional management and policy areas. The results are similar to the findings
of a prior study: Yang and Callahan (2007) have found that professional city managers
adopt many citizen participation mechanisms, but do not use them in strategic decision-
making processes for fear of losing their administrative control and powers. Likewise,
public managers do not want to lose their administrative control in management and
policy areas. Although local bureaucrats establish more citizen participation mechanisms
in response to reduced political influence, they may hesitate to substantively use citizen
participation in particular service areas and management functions in order not to lose
control (Irvin & Stansbury, 2004).
The findings of this study indicate that the council-manager form of government
increases the adoption of citizen involvement mechanisms. These results are consistent
with those of prior studies (Ebdon, 2000; Yang & Callahan, 2005, 2007; Wang, 2001).
Specifically, professional managers adopt more citizen participation programs than
elected officials because they possess the professional experience and knowledge that
identifies citizen’s needs (Yang & Callahan, 2005, 2007). From a political market
framework, they have low incentives isolated from political benefits (Frant, 1996) and
promote the use of citizen participation to improve governmental performance, whereas
elected officials’ incentives to promote citizen involvement are contingent on whether
citizen participation is beneficial to their reelection.
Nonpartisan elections are another antecedent that pushes local governments 
to adopt more citizen participation mechanisms. Jackman (1987) finds that a small
number of political parties increases voter turnout because less partisan competition
encourages citizen political participation. In line with political participation, this finding
indicates that local administrators in cities with nonpartisan elections want to create
long-term policies that improve citizens’ well-being because they are less controlled
by local partisan politicians. They believe that citizen participation programs are good
instruments to enhance community prosperity by reflecting citizens’ needs or demands.
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Lastly, the findings indicate that at-large elections are not directly related to the
adoption of either citizen involvement effort. A prior study has argued that, rather,
cities where councilors are elected by district seek more citizen input to solve political
conflicts within the community (Ebdon, 2000). At-large council elections may drive
local administrators to adopt citizen participation programs by shielding them from
community-based political influences. Despite such bureaucratic efforts, council members
may not be interested in community-based citizen engagement because they represent
broad median voter interests across jurisdictions. In cities with at-large elections, council
members’ weak interests may decrease the adoption of citizen participation programs.
Most control variables are also statistically associated with the two types of citizen
participation. Interestingly, per capita total expenditure increases both citizen participa-
tion mechanisms and the use of citizen participation in functional areas. Prior studies
have argued that citizen participation entails considerable administrative costs (Irvin &
Stansbury, 2004; Moynihan, 2003). The findings imply that local governments adopt
more citizen participation mechanism when they can afford the costs of these mecha-
nisms. Governmental efforts to manage and measure local performance lead to greater
adoption of administrative participation programs. Local governments can effectively
manage and measure local performance by listening to citizens’ voices in citizens’
boards or public hearings and conducting more citizen surveys.
Large and diverse cities establish many citizen participation channels to identify
complex service needs within their communities, and highly educated residents push
the local bureaucracy to adopt more citizen participation programs due to their interest
in and knowledge of policy processes (Nalbandian, 1991; Protasel, 1988). Wealthy
cities can afford to establish many citizen participation mechanisms. Cities in the
southern region use fewer citizen participation programs than cities in other regions
because their elite-oriented political cultures do not include strong citizen participatory
traditions (Ebdon, 2000). The findings also show that cities in metropolitan areas
adopt more citizen involvement mechanisms. Just like large cities, cities in metropolitan
areas need to provide complex services that satisfy diverse population groups, which
may increase their use of citizen participation mechanisms.
The results of this study suggest theoretical and practical implications for citizen
involvement efforts. One theoretical implication is that the study discovered new
external antecedents of citizen participation from the institutional perspective. High-
level political institutions such as nonpartisan elections increase the adoption of citizen
participation programs at the operational level. In particular, the findings confirm the
classical argument that politics are interconnected with public administration. Given
that politics strongly affects the public bureaucracy, this study theoretically clarifies
how politics affects bureaucratic practices such as citizen participation. The adoption
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mechanisms are explained by elected officials’ rational choices and uncertainties in
institutional environments created by different political institutions. In other words, a
public bureaucracy can use more participatory mechanisms for long-term polices when
it is less constrained by politicians who consider only short-term policies associated
with their reelection.
From the sociological institutional perspective, local governments adopt bureau-
cratic institutions such as citizen participation due to isomorphic mechanisms without
calculating their benefits. However, our findings show that from the new economic
institutional perspective, elected officials’ incentives maximizing their political benefits
are associated with how many citizen participation tools local government use. These
findings can provide further insights on how political contexts influence bureaucratic
practices such as red tape, contracting, and policy implementation programs in addition
to citizen participation.
A practical implication of the study is that it encourages practitioners to rethink the
rationales of early progressive municipal reforms, which were intended to shield local
bureaucracies from negative political forces. The results indicate that such reform
efforts still are applicable in current management and policy practices. Practitioners
should consider designing local executive and electoral institutions that protect local
bureaucracies from short-term political influences, because these institutions encourage
local governments to adopt more citizen participation programs for developing long-
term policies. In particular, our findings provide a useful practical implication from the
US experience for developing countries that want to encourage citizen participation.
For example, the Korean Congress recently decided to replace partisan elections with
nonpartisan elections at the municipal level because the partisan elections had engen-
dered many side effects such as corruption and poor local performance. In addition to
decreased side-effects, local structural reforms excluding political influences may help
local governments use more citizen participation programs to enhance the long-term
effects of local policies.
This study also has a few limitations. First, it employed only two dimensions of 
citizen participation as dependent variables. Prior studies identified multidimensional
constructs of citizen involvement efforts and their purposes and objectives (Wang, 2001;
Yang & Callahan, 2005). In addition, the number of citizen participation programs used
by a local government was measured only by how many participatory tools a local
government has rather than the actual implementation of citizen participation or how
many citizens participate in these programs. Therefore, our study was not able to
establish a clear association between political institutions and citizen participation.
Future studies need to test the effects of political institutions on other dimensions of
citizen participation and actual implementation of citizen participation. Further study
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is also needed to empirically examine whether citizen participation programs improve
government performance and community outcomes. Finally, the focus of this study
was on the United States, and political contexts in other countries may differ. The
impacts of local politics on citizen participation need to be investigated in a broader
range of countries.
In spite of these limitations, this study is an initial step in understanding the institu-
tional contexts surrounding citizen participation by clarifying the external factors that
drive local governments to establish citizen participation programs.
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APPENDIX: VARIABLES AND DATA SOURCES
Dependent Variables
Citizen Participation Mechanisms (Source: ICMA State of Profession 2006)
When local government offers opportunities for citizen engagement in community




• Citizen participation on boards or commissions
• Ad hoc task force
• Citizen survey
Citizen Participation in Functional Areas (Source: ICMA Municipal Form of Government 2006)
When your municipality has citizen authorities, boards, or commissions, in which






• Police and safety
• Economic development
• Code enforcement
• Parks and recreation
Explanatory Variables
Political Institutions (Source: ICMA Municipal Form of Government 2006)
• Form of government: council-manager = 1; otherwise = 0
• Nonpartisan election: no party affiliation appears on the ballot in council elections
= 1; otherwise = 0
• At-large council: councilor elected by all in at-large election = 1; otherwise = 0
Management (Sources: US Census Local Government Finance 2002, ICMA State of Profession 2006)
• Local expenditure: per capita total local expenditure
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• Performance activities: performance management and measurement activities:
yes = 1; no = 0
Demographics (Source: US Census Population 2000)
• Population: population per thousand
• Diversity: Herfindahl–Hirschman Index [1-∑(percentage of each ethnicity)^2 ]
• Income: per capita income
• Educational level: percentage of residents with more than a bachelor’s degree
Geography (Source: ICMA State of Profession 2006)
• South: southern region=1; north central, northeast, and western regions=0
• Metropolitan area: central metropolitan area =1, independent and suburban areas = 0
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